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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRANK J. ALLEN, 
Pldilntijf and Appellant, 
vs. 
SOUTHERN P kCIFIC COMPANY, 
Defendmnt and Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATE·MENT 
Case No. 
7367 
In the case now before this court, appellant Allen, 
(plaintiff below) seeks to recover the very substantial 
sum of Two Thousand One Hundred and Ninety ($2,-
190.00) Dollars for 10 cents paid respondent as consid-
eration for checking appellant's bag. The appellant's 
complaint alleged, and the court found, that on Septem-
ber 10, 1947, at Portland, Oregon, appellant delivered 
to respondent, at its station parcel room, appellant's 
forty-seven dollar bag, containing expensive jewelry, 
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high priced clothing, (including two suits and a top coat, 
each valued by appellant at some $85, and a wool shirt 
valued at $22.50), a radio, a Parker pen set, valued at 
$65, a 20-30 revolver, and other items. The court found 
that at the time of the said delivery, appellant was en 
route from Portland to Pocatello, Idaho, and as· there-
spondent's parcel room was at the railroad station, it can 
be safely inferred that appellant was then travelling to 
Idaho on an interstate train. The court further found 
the following significant facts. The parcel check given 
appellant upon deposit of his bag had on one side, in 
large type, the word ''NOTICE,'' followed by a stated 
limitation of respondent's liability not to exceed $25 
"for loss of, damage or delay to, any parcel" unless the 
customer then declared and paid for a greater sum. ·Oii 
the reverse side of this parcel check given to appellant 
were these words, in large print: 
"DATE AND TIME DELIVERED. FOR 
EXCESS LIABILITY· s·EE NOTICE ON OP-
POSITE SIDE." 
Then followed the storage rate of 10 cents for each 24 
hours. The court also found that respondent, at the time 
of the delivery of the bag, had posted at its parcel roolm 
"where it was visible to pla'rimti[f," (Italics ours), a sign 
upon which appeared the following words in large, plain 
print. 
( 
I 
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''Protect Your 
PARCELS 
Our Liability for Loss or Damage is 
Limited to 
$25.00 
"Greater value n1ay be declared at time of 
checking upon payment of 10 cents for each addi-
tional $25.00 value or fraction thereof. 
''Parcels or articles exceeding $250.00 in 
value not accepted.'' 
The appellant admitted in his reply, that he never 
declared any value for his bag or iPcontents, and there is 
no finding that respondent or its agents ever knew of 
that value, or what the bag contained. 
Respondent, in Paragraph 5 of its second an1ended 
answer to plaintiff's complaint, alleged that any delivery 
to defendant of any article, including the alleged Samp-
sonite bag, was at all times subject to the terms and con-
ditions written on the claim check and the posted notice. 
Planti:ff's reply denied those allegations. The final plead-
ings of both parties and the exact form and wording of 
the claim check and posted notice are fully set out in 
appellant's brief, and therefore do not here need to be 
repeated verbatim. Respondent would, however, like to 
call the court's attention to two very important items 
in its said answer and the said claim check and posted 
notice. First, the limitations of value there set forth 
were not a flat, or fixed limitation of liability, but pro-
vided for a declaration of value by the customer, and a 
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charge made by respondent according to this declared 
value. For the first 10 cents paid to check a bag, the cus-
tomer received liability coverage from respondent up 
to $25. The customer could receive further coverage 
upon payment of 10 cents for each additional $25 of value 
or fraction thereof declared. Respondent, by the terms of 
the parcel check and the posted notice, also gave notice 
that it would not accept articles exceeding $250.00 ill 
value. 
Second, in the last two paragraphs of section num-
bered 5 of respondent's amended answer, respondent 
alleged that ''plaintiff then and there had notice of said 
provisions and terms of the said parcel check and posted 
notice above set forth''; and further alleged ''that plain-
tiff did not at the alleged time of his making the alleged 
delivery and deposit of said bag, nor at any other time 
mentioned in said complaint, make any declaration of 
value as to said bag or its contents nor pay the additional 
charge required in case of value in .excess of $25.00.'' 
In his reply, appellant alleged that he was without 
notice of the terms of the claim check. He admitted as 
above stated, that he made no declaration of value or paid 
to respondent anything beyond the original charge of 
10 cents. He denied, in the reply, all of the respondent's 
allegations as to the posted notice, including its presence 
and that it was, at the time and place in question, plainly 
visible. 
Appellant has seen fit to make his appeal without 
placing- before this court the evidence presented below. 
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The court therefore has only the pleadings, findings, con-
clusions and judgment of the lower court to consider., 
That court, sitting without a jury, and after hearing all 
of the testimony and viewing the evidence, concluded 
that, though respondent was liable for the loss of appel-
lant's bag and contents, its liability 'vas limited by con-
tract between the parties to Twenty-five ($25.00) Dollars. 
Respondent submits that the judgment of the lower 
court is correct, and that upon the record before this 
court, that judgment must be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE SO-CALLED CONCLUSION OF LAW OF 
THE LOWER COURT THAT THE DEFENDANT'S 
LIABILITY WAS LIMITED BY CONTRACT TO A 
SUM OF NOT TO EXCEED TWENTY-FIVE ($25.00) 
DOLLARS IS ACTUALLY A FINDING OF FACT 
WHICH CONTROLS THIS CASE AND CANNOT 
HERE BE DISTURBED ON APPEAL 
As repeatedly stated by this court, its only concern, 
where the appeal is on the judgment roll, is whether the 
pleadings, findings of fact and conclusions of law sup-
port the judgment. Gray vs. Defa, 103 Utah 339, 135 Pac. 
2d 251; and SandJaU vs. Hoskins, 104 Utah 50, 137 Pac. 
2d 819. 
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Respondent respectfully submits that the court be-
low was correct in limiting its judgn1ent for plaintiff to 
the amount of $25. This judgment is based not only upon 
the fact that respondent, by having the printed notice on 
the ticket (set forth in the court's finding of fact No.5) 
and by posting the notice (set out in finding No.6), lim-
ited the amount that plaintiff might recover, but also 
upon the conclusion, or finding, of the court that "the 
extent of defendant's liability for such loss was by con-
tract limited to the sum of not to exceed Twenty-five 
( $25.00) Dollars." Here we have a definite and specific 
statement by the court that such a contract between the 
parties existed. The result is no different because the 
court called this statement a conclusion of law instead 
of a finding of fact. The distinction between a finding of 
fact and conclusion of law is a mere formality and, as this 
court has held, does not determine the nature of the state-
ment. Dunoan v. Hemmelwright, 186 Pac. 2d 965, .... 
Utah ........ , citing Sanfiall vs. Hoskins, supra. Respondent, 
moreover, contends that the existence or nonexistence of 
a contract is an ultimate fact. This court has so held. In 
the recent case of .Sandall vs Hoskins, supra, the lower 
court made the finding of fact, as stated with approval 
by this court, ''that the parties agreed that the lessees 
should have all of the rents ... , and that the grazing 
rights were not reserved to the lessor.'' This court held 
that this conclusion was a finding of fact, ''especially 
in view that it sets out the basis for the conclusion 
reached.'' In our case, the existence· of the contract is 
the ultimate fact which is supported by the lower court's 
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finding that defendant had printed on the clai1n check 
a notice of limitation, and had posted at the time and 
place of the delivery of plaintiff's bag, a printed sign, 
visible to plaintiff, giving notice of the stated limitation 
of liability. Again, in Gna.y vs. Defa, supra, this court 
classified as a finding the conclusion of the lower court 
''that defendants had forfeited all rights under the var-
ious agreements.'' So here, respondent again stresses 
that, the so-called "conclusion of law" that the liability of 
defendant was limited by contract, is in truth an ultimate 
fact. As this court has ruled, findings should contain 
only such ultimate facts and not detailed subsidiary facts 
upon which the ultimate fact is based. Dwnoan vs. Hem-
melzrright, supra. If this court concludes that the lower 
court's statement as to the existence of a contract is a 
conclusion of law, that statement, however, still forms 
the basis of the judgment. In another Utah decision, 
Homer vs. Oregon Short LineR. R., 42 Utah 15, 128 Pac. 
522, this court ruled that the effect of conditions con-
tained in the ticket, and the rules and regulations govern-
ing the care of baggage (as filed with the I. C. C.) '' ... was 
entirely for the court, and, although they had been ex-
pressly admitted in evidence, the result, so far as it af-
fected appellant's liability, would still have been the same 
as a matter of law.'' 
The Colorado case of French vs. Bekins M oV'ing & 
Storage Co., 195 Pac. 2d 968, approved of the trial court's 
finding that the defendant "was liable upon a contractual 
limitation of ten cents per pound ... (which) neces-
sarily i1nplies a finding that plaintiff did knowingly as-
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sent to the ten cent limitation, and supports that find-
ing." In Geo·rge, et al, vs. Bekins Van & Storage Co., et 
al, 205 P. 2d 1037, the California court observed that "the 
trial court found that plaintiff never agreed to the de-
clared value.'' The above decisions all agree that it is 
the prerogative of the trial court to find whether an 
agreement of limitation was made between the parties. 
In our own situation, that is exactly what the lower court 
did. 
The established rule of this court is that it is re-
quired, in the absence of a bill of exceptions, to assume 
that the findings of the lower court are supported by the 
evidence. Gro;y vs. De fa, supra and 0 'Gorman vs. Utah 
Re.alty GJYI)d Construction Company, 102 Utah 523, 129 
Pac. 2d 981. In the Gray case this court commented as 
follows: ''We would therefore ordinarily assume that the 
finding of the court that defendants had ·forfeited all 
rights under the various agreements and the contract 
of sale was supported by the evidence.'' That appeal was 
upon the judgment roll only. The wording just quoted 
has a striking application to the case now before the 
court. This court must assume, in the absence of any 
evidence, that the lower court was correct in deciding that 
a contract existed between respondent and appellant 
limiting appellant's liability not to exceed $25. The 
Supreme Court of Minnesota among others, also holds 
that the appellate court cannot disregard the lower 
court's findings and substitute i•ts own. Joyce vs. Janes-
i 
I 
j 
( 
I 
~ 
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'rille, 155 N. ,V. 1067, L.R.A. 1916D, 426. In accord, see 
Scott 'l'S. Ford, (Ore.) 78 Pac. 742, and Vol. 3'Amcrioan 
Juris pntd ence, Page 462. 
Paragraph 7 of the lower court's finding states that 
the defendant did not see or read the posted sign or the 
printing on the parcel check, and that the plaintiff had 
no lmowledge of any limitation of liability by defendant, 
but nothing in the findings of the court negatives the 
proposition that plaintiff had notice in the legal sense 
of the word of such limitation through the obvious 
printed matter on the parcel check and the posted notice, 
which notice the court found "was visible to plaintiff 
as he checked his said bag.'' Nothing in the findings pre-
cludes any ultimate finding that the contract of limitation 
existed. 
It is true that some parts of the findings may appear 
inconsistent or ambiguous. If such is the case, the courts 
held that any inconsistency or ambiguity will be con-
strued to support the judgment. See Hotaling vs. Hotal-
ing (Cal.) 224 Pac. 455, 56 A.L.R. 734. V10lunteer State 
Life InsuratYtCe Oompany vs. Richardson (Tenn.) 244 S. 
W. 44,26 A.L.R.1270; and Chase vs. Hifnckley (Wis.) 105 
N.W. 230. As stated in Volume 3 American Jurisprud-
ence Page 463 : ''In other words ambiguous findings will 
be given a construction which will support the judgment, 
rather than one which will require its reversal.'' Re-
spondent therefor submits that the statement of the 
lower court that defendant's liability was by contract 
limited to $25 is a finding conclusive upon this court and 
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cures any defect elsewhere appearing in the court's find-
ings. 
II 
A LIMITATION OF LIABILITY IN THIS CASE 
IS NOT CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY AND W .NS 
AND IS EFFECTIVE TO LIMIT LIABILITY FOR 
RESPONDENT'S LOSS OF APPELLANT'S PROP-
ERTY. 
Appellant contends, in his first point of argument, 
that the limitation of liability as set forth in the parcel 
check arid the posted notice referred to in the findings 
of fact is contrary to public policy and hence void. In 
appellant's second point he contends that in any event, 
such a limitation is ineffective to limit liability for any 
conversion of plaintiff's property by defendant. The 
third point argued by appellant is that the limitation 
must have been accepted by him, and that "no acceptance 
is shown.'' His fourth point is that the wording of this 
particular limitation does not cover the type of loss now 
under consideration. These points 3:re so closely related, 
and the various decisions so intermingle with them, that 
respondent will discuss all of them together. Later in the 
brief respondent will consider appellant's points three 
and four again, but separately. 
It must be kept in mind at all times throughout the 
consideration of our problem, that we are concerned with 
a limitation which varies in amount in direct proportion 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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to the value declared and the charge paid by the bailor or 
shipper, and not with a limitation that either attempts 
to exempt a bailor from liability, or sets a fixed and flat 
limit regardless of any declared value. Appellant's cases 
are concerned with this last type of limitation, and hence 
do not apply to the instant case. 
Let us see whether the courts and laws of the differ-
ent jurisdictions support appellant's arguments. 
The Supreme Court of the United States, in Boston 
& Maitn R. R. vs. Booker, 233 U.S. 97, 58 L. Ed., 868, de-
cided in 1913, passed upon a Federal Statute regulating, 
among other things the shipping of baggage. This statute 
with certain amendments, is now 49 U.S.C.A. Sec. 6 (1). 
At the time this case arose, the statute (24 Stat. 380, 
as amended by 34 Stat. 586, Chap. 3591, provided: 
''That every common carrier subject to the 
provisions of this act shall file with the Commis-
sion created by this act, and print and keep open 
to public inspection, schedules showing all the 
rates, fares, and charges for transportation. . . . 
The schedules printed as aforesaid by and such 
common carrier . . . shall also state separately 
all terminal charges, storage charges, icing 
charges, and all other charges which the Commis-
sion may require, all privileges or facilities 
granted or allowed, and any rules or regulations 
which in anywise change, affect, or determine any 
part or the aggregate of such aforesaid rates, 
fares, and charges, or the value of the service 
rendered to the passenger, shipper, or consignee. 
Such schedules shall be plainly printed in large 
type, and copies for the use of the public shall be 
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kept posted in two p.ublic and ~onspicuous pla~es 
in every depot, statwn, or off1ce of such carrier 
where passengers or freight, respectively, are re-
ceived for transportation, in such form that they 
shall be accessible to the public, and can be con-
veniently inspected. The provisions of this see-
tion shall apply to all traffic, transportation, and 
facilities defined in this chapter.'' 
The suit was for loss, through negligence, o.f plaintiff's 
hand bag while in the custody of defendant at its station. 
The loss occurred some twenty-six hours after the trip 
had ended. The lower court found that the carrier had 
filed'its schedules of rates with the Interstate Commerce 
Commission. These schedules limited liability to $100 
and provided as follows: ''For excess value the rate will 
be one-half of the current excess baggage rate per 100 
pounds for each $100 of increased value declared ... " 
''Baggage liability is limited to personal baggage 
not to exceed $100 ... unless a greater value is declared 
and stipulated by the owner and existing charges thereon 
paid at time of checking the baggage.'' The lower court 
further found· that the railroad had notices posted "in 
the baggage room of the station, in a conspicuous place, 
and in sight of persons using the room for checking bag-
gage'' and containing information with reference to ex-
cess weight. But no ticket or posted notice referred to 
a declaration of value, or any value limit, which were 
contained only in the schedule. The lower court also 
found that plaintiff did not declare that her baggage 
exceeded $100 in value nor pay any charges for excess 
! 
I 
) 
I 
I 
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Yaluation. No bill of lading, baggage check or other re-
ceipt is here involved. The only ticket was the passenger's 
railroad ticket under which plaintiff had checked his 
baggage. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment 
of the ~!assachusetts court which had held the limitation 
invalid. The Supreme Court also held that the fact that 
the plaintiff had no knowledge of the regulations limit-
ing liability and that the railroad had not inquired as to 
the value, was immaterial. The Court quoted from 
Adams Exp. Co. vs. Groninger, 226 U. S. 509, 57 L. Ed. 
314, 321, as follows: ''The knowledge of the shipper that 
the rate was based upon the value is to be presumed from 
the terms of the bill of lading and of the published sche-
dules.'' The court cited and quoted from Kams1as (]lity 
So. R. Co. vs. Carl, 227 U.S. 640, 57 L. Ed. 683, 688: 
''The valuation the shipper declares deter-
mines the legal rate where there are two rates 
based upon valuation. He must take notice of 
the rate applicable, and actual want of knowledge 
is no excuse. The rate, when made out and filed, 
is notice, and its effect is not lost, although it 
is not actually posted in the station. (Citing 
cases). It would open a wide doo'r to frawd and 
destroy the uniform operation of the published 
tariff rate sheets. When there are two published 
rates, based upon difference in value, the legal 
rate automatically attaches itself to the declared 
or agreed value. Neither the intentional nor acci-
dental misstatement of the applicable published 
rate will bind the carrier or shipper." (Italics 
ours) 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
The following statement from New y,ork C. & H.R.R. Co·. 
vs. Fr-alof/, 100 U.S. 24, 25 L. Ed. 531, is quoted by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in the above Boston & M~ain R. R. Co. 
decision: 
''And in order that such regulations may 
be practically effective and the carrier advised 
of the full extent of its responsibility, and, conse-
quently, of the degree of precaution necessary upon 
its part, it may rightfully require, as a condi-
tion precedent to any contract for the transpor-
tation of baggage, information from the passenger 
as to its value; and if the value thus disclosed 
exceeds that which the passenger may reason-
ably demand to be transported as baggage with-
out extra compensation the carrier, at its option, 
can make such additional charges as the risk 
fairly justifies.'' 
The Boston decision also cited M K T R Company vs. 
Harriman, 227 U.S. 699, 57 L. Ed. 690, to the eff·ect that 
the shipper was compelled to take notice of rate sheets 
not only because referred to in the contract signed by 
them, but because they had been lawfully filed and pub-
lished. '' ' ... the shipper must take notice, for the valu-
ation automatically determines which of the rates is the 
lawful rate.' '' The Boston & M~ain opinion ruled that 
the contract between the shipper and carrier is not the 
bill of lading alone but all the schedules and tariffs, 
and also stated a principle which can very well be applied 
to our instant case: ''A common carrier may prescribe 
regulations to protect himself against imposition and 
fraud and fix a rate charge proportionate to the amount 
! 
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of the risk he may be put to incur." The decision does 
not distinguish between losses through conversion of the 
property and through other means, and holds that a 
recovery may not be had beyond the amount stipulated 
even though the loss results from the carrier's negli-
gence. The decision cited other Supreme Court cases, 
including Hart vs. P. R. R. Co., 112 U.S. 331, 28 L. Ed. 
717, in support of this rule. The Court commented that 
this is the New York ruling, and cites a number of New 
York decisions. 
That case is of added significance in considering our 
question because the federal statute there discussed 
makes no reference to the type of notice required to be 
given. It does not state whether or not the notice is 
to be actual or whether the shipper must know of or 
''acquiesce'' in the limitation. Mr. Samuel Williston, 
who argued the cause for the shipper, contended, to no 
avail, that the carrier must prove ''assent'' of the ship-
per to the limitation, and that its terms ''must be brought 
home to him.'' The Supreme Court rejected this con-
tention and ruled that the Massachusetts court committed 
error in requiring such proof. 
Even though this court may finally decide that the 
present case is not within the federal statute considered 
in the Supreme Court decisions which respondent cites, 
those decisions, are, by analogy, excellent authority for 
respondent's 1arguments. State court decisions, including 
those of Oregon, so consider them to be. For example, 
the following Supreme Court decisions are in point. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
In N.Y.C.R. Co. vs. Beham, 242 U. S. 148, 61 L. Ed. 
210, plaintiff claimed that she did not read the baggage 
receipt, and the Missouri court ruled that defendant must 
show that plaintiff expressly consented to the limitation. 
The U.S. Supreme Court held that, "the acceptance and 
w~e of the ticket sufficed to establish an agreement prima 
facie valid which limited the carrier's liability. Mere 
failure to read the matter plainly placed before her could 
not overcome the presumption of assent.'' The Court 
laid down the above rule without any refer·ence to tariff 
schedules or the Federal Statute. In fact, the schedules 
had not been considered by the lower court. In the case 
now under review the lower court found that appellant, 
Allen, accepted -and used the ticket with the limitation 
thereon, and the court found that the contract limiting 
liability was thereby created. No evidence is now before 
this court which would tend to overcome the '' presump-
tion of assent." 
Our United States Supreme Court has well sum-
marized the rule respecting limitations of liability in 
Steamship Ans,aldo vs. Rheinstrom Bros. Co., 294 U. S. 
494, 79 L. Ed. 1016. The decision itself involved a limita-
tion unlike the one now before this court, because the 
shipper had not been offered a choice of rates, and the 
value was set by the carrier as shown in the invoice. The 
lower court commissioner found that there was no choice 
of rates offered according to the value placed upon the 
goods. The opinion cited with approval the above Su-
1 ( 
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preme Court cases and commented upon a limitation such 
as ours in the following language: 
"Two so-called valuation clauses have been 
in frequent use. One is a true limitation agree-
ment. It recites that a sum named on the bill of 
lading is the agreed value of the goods, or their 
value per unit or per package, in the absence of 
the shipper's declaration of a higher value; that 
the rate is fixed with reference to the specified 
value, and if a greater be declared a higher rate 
will apply; that in consideration of the rate to 
be charged, the carrier's liability for loss or dam-
age shall be limited to the stipulated value . . . 
Agreements of this kind are held to he reasonable 
and not offensive to the public policy against con-
tracts relieving the carrier from its own negli-
gence. The agreement as to value in considera-
tion of carriage at the lower rate thus obtained 
is held· to estop the shipper from demanding 
damages in excess of the agreed value.'' 
In referring to a limitation of liability and a bill 
of lading whereby the shipper and carrier agree on the 
value of the goods at the time of shipment, and even 
though no choice of rates is offered the shipper, the 
opinion commented that "the weight of authority in 
the state courts seems to be in favor of upholding the 
clause even though no such choice is open to the shipper." 
Decisions of the U. S. Supreme Court concerning the 
terms of a free railroad pass are also, by analogy, per-
tinent to our case. Those decisions uniformly hold that 
a person accepting a pass in interstate commerce from 
a carrier is bound by the terms thereon even though the 
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passenger does not read the terms or know of them. The 
carrier may, by stipulations contained in such a pass, 
exempt itself from responsibility for negligence without 
violating public policy. Kans~as City Railway Oompwny 
vs. Van Za.nt, 260 U.S. 459, 67 L. Ed. 348; Boering vs. 
Ohesa.peake Beach R·ailway OompaffiJY, 193 U.S. 442, 48 
L. Ed. 742. 
This court, in considering a bailment made in Ore-
gon, will give full consideration to the decisions and laws 
of that state. In fact, the validity, interpretation and 
effect of a contract, whether of bailment or otherwise is 
' controlled by the lex loci cont'f1actus. Crofaot vs. That.. 
cher, 19 U. 212, 57 Pac. 171. Let us review the opinions 
of the 'Supreme Court of Oregon. In No·rmlile vs. Oregon 
R. & NaL·. Co., 69 Pac. 928, the court passed upon the 
validity of a bill of lading which provided a declaration 
of value as follows: 
" 'that the said company has this day re-
ceived from the shipper ... two head of mules 
to be transported . . . at the rate of (so much) 
per head, which is less than the tariff rate for 
the tranportation of livestock at carrier's risk and 
is given said shipper in part consideration of his 
agreement to the limitation of the liability said 
company as common carrier, ... And it is here-
by further agreed that the value of the livestock to 
be transported under this contract does not ex-
ceed the following mentioned sum ... each mule 
$100'. " 
The uncontroverted evidence was that the shipper 
knew nothing of the price of shipment or the rate. At 
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the tilne he took the goods to the carrier's dock, the 
defendant's agent produced a shipping receipt and told 
him to sign, which he did. Neither pla.inti.jf nor his agent 
read the bill of Zadin.g or rece!ipt or knew its contents. 
The Oregon court reversed the lower court's judgment 
for plaintiff, and held that the bill of lading was not con-
trary to public policy. "It can make no difference 
whether the valuation expressed in the contract is one 
previously named by the shipper on requirement of the 
carrier, or one inserted in the contract by the carrier 
without being named by the shipper, but acquiesced 
in by him. In either case, it becomes a part of the con-
tract, on which the minds of the parties meet, and on 
which they act ... '' It is important to note that the 
evidence there was that plaintiff's mule was injured 
through defendant's negligence committed in unloading 
the mule. The opinion contains a long discussion of the 
distinction between a carrier's attempt to exempt itself 
from full or partial liability, and a stipulation as to 
value. 
"Plaintiff cannot consistently claim a higher 
valuation upon the agreed rate of freight, and 
the contract is not, in any proper sense, one for 
the exemption of defendant from the consequences 
of negligence ... Such stipulations and contracts 
are supported and upheld upon considerations of 
fairness, as they relate both to the shipper and 
the carrier. We .are led to this concl!usion by oases 
of palpable analogy and high a.uthor+ity. Indeed, 
there are but few 'O'pposed." (Italics ours). 
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The court then cited the U.S. Supreme Court case of 
Hart vs. Ra.i.lro~ad Co. supra, and other decisions in sup-
port of its opinion. Another point in favor of respon-
dent here is that the court held that the Oregon trial 
court committed error in leaving the question to the jury 
''whether there was any consideration in the way of a 
lower or less than ordinary rate for a limitation of the 
defendant's liability for negligence as to such (live-
stock)." The plaintiff, in his complaint, had attempted 
to recover upon the common law liability of a carrier 
for damage or loss through its negligence. The Oregon 
court ruled that he was not so entitled to recover, "hav-
ing entered into a special contract relative to the utmost 
value of the animal injured.'' In our case, the lower 
court found that the respondent had made a valid con-
tract of limitation with plaintiff, and this court must 
assume that competent and sufficient evidence existed 
to support such a result. 
Another Oregon decision illustrating the point that 
that state does not consider limitations of liability by 
a carrier in violation of public policy is Goldstein vs. 
Robert Dollar Co., 270 Pac. 903. While the facts are not 
directly in point, in that the bill of lading in question was 
sent to the shipper some ten days after he had delivered 
the goods to the carrier, the observations of the court 
and the rulings on certain matters of laws are impor-
tant. There, defendant claimed that the plaintiff's ac-
ceptance of the bill of lading without objection precluded 
him from disputing its terms. The court observed that 
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defendant's position ·would have been much more favor-
able ''if the issuance of the bill of lading had been con-
temporaneous with the delivery of the automobile.'' The 
court ruled that the point whether plaintiff assented to 
the terms of the bill of lading was a question of fact for 
the jury. In applying this ruling to our case, the lower 
court, in the place of a jury, must be held to have found 
that such assent existed in order to find that a contract 
was made between the parties, and it is not for this 
court to revise that finding. 
Approving the Normile vs. Oregon R. & N·av. Co. 
case, supra, is Voyt vs. Bekins Moving & Storrage Co., 
119 Pac. 2d 586, rehearing denied, 127 P. 2d 360. There, 
a warehouse receipt was the subject of discussion. The 
receipt was mailed to the bailor (plaintiff) about two 
weeks after the goods were delivered to defendant. The 
plaintiff had never signed it and, in fact, had never seen 
it until it was delivered in the mail. The receipt stated 
that the limit of liability was $10 per 100 lbs. The de-
fendant, in the lower court, never proved that these 
storage charges were fixed on the basis of the agreed 
limitation. An additional fact stressed by the court is 
that defendant's agent knew when the trunk was delivered 
to defendant that it contained silver and was therefore of 
value much in excess of the stated limit. "The crucial 
element in the case at bar is the fact of the actual know-
ledge communicated to the warehouse concerning the 
identity and substantial value of the silver." The court 
also pointed out that the wording of the limitation was 
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"ambiguous in that it did not clearly show that the rate 
charged was based on the $10 limitation.'' That action 
was based upon the theory of negligence, and the court 
did not make any distinction between that form of suit 
and any other type of suit for the recovery of the value 
of lost or damaged goods. In fact, the decision cited 
and quoted from an Ohio case, Centffial St.or,age Ware-
house Co. vs. Pickering, 151 N. E. 39, which was an action 
in trover, alleging negligence. In that case, as the Ore-
gon court comments, the receipt was signed only by the 
warehouseman but it was delivered at the time the goods 
were received in storage. 
The V oyt case approved the Normile case, as fol-
lows: 
''The trial court was apparently of the opin-
ion that a stipulation as to the agreed value of 
goods is void if the goods were lost through the 
negligence of the warehouseman. If the court 
intended to and did so instruct it was ·error. Under 
the Normile oase ·a valid contrtactual provis~on 
as to 1agff'eed value fairly arrived at is binding 
notwithsbanding the negligent loss of the goods 
by the defendant." (Italics ours). 
This is the most recent word of the Oregon court 
on this subject. The decision also gives to a warehouse-
man greater bargaining rights· than to a common carrier 
but because of the ''specific facts in the case,'' the court 
affirmed the judgment for plaintiff. 
The Or.egon statute applied in the V oyt case is 
known as the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act. Vol. 
4, O.C.L.A., Section 60~203 of that act provides that 
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a warehouseinan n1ay insert in a receipt ''any other 
terms and conditions provided that such terms and con-
ditions shall not impair his obligation to exercise that 
degree of care . . . which a reasonably careful man would 
exercise in regard to similar goods of his own.'' The 
Yoyt opinion states that the better view supports a limi-
tation of liability" 'if the requisites for the formation of 
a contract are satisfied,' " citing and quoting 4 Willist:on 
on Contracts, Rev. Ed., Page 2927. On rehearing in the 
r oyt case, the Oregon Supreme Court again stated the 
rule "that parties may make a binding contract con-
cerning the value of the goods bailed and which will be 
effective even in the event of negligence.'' 
A further difference between that Oregon decision 
and our present case is that the reviewing court had before 
it all of the trial testimony, and, therefore, had a basis 
for determining the question whether the elements of a 
binding contract of limitation were present under the 
circumstances. 
The Oregon court, upon its opinion rendered on the 
rehearing of the V oyt case, 127 Pac. 2d 360, at page 364, 
also made this pertinent observation: 
''If this were a case in which a schedule of 
rates showing a basic rate and the higher charges 
made for higher valuations appeared upon the 
receipt or was on file pursuant to law, a different 
situation would arise.'' 
In the case now before this court, that is exactly what we 
have: a schedule of rates and higher charges for higher 
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valuations appearing upon the receipt and filed pursuant 
to law. The dissent of the three judges in the V oyt opin-
ion on rehearing shows the invalidity of the appellant's 
argument here that his lack of knowledge of the con-
tents of the baggage check or parcel check and the posted 
notice should preclude his being bound by the limitation. 
This opinion cited and quoted from Williston and other 
authorities, including a statement by Justice Learned 
Hand of the New York court, as follows: 
" 'A contract is an obligation attached by 
the mere force of law to certain acts of the par-
ties, usually words, which ordinarily accompany 
and ·represent a known intent. If, however, it were 
proved ... that either party ... intended some-
thing else than the usual meaning which the law 
imposes upon (the words), he would still be held 
unless there were some mutual mistake, or some-
thing else of the sort.' '' 
The V oyt opinion quoted from Williston on Con-
tracts, as follows: 
" 'It follows from the principle that mani-
fested mutual assent rather than actual mental 
assent is the essental element in the formation of 
contracts, that a mistaken idea of one or both par-
ties in regard to the meaning of an offer or ac-
ceptance will not prevent the formation of a con-
tract.' '' 
In the instant case, we have a fair notice not only 
posted and visible to the plaintiff, as found by the court, 
but we have a baggage check containing a notice of 
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limitation of value. 'Ye have no finding by the trial 
court that plaintiff did not assent, in the legal sense of the 
word, to the terms, nor do we have a finding which nega-
tiYes notice given by defendant. On the contrary, we have 
the court's finding, there called a conclusion, that a 
contract existed to fix the value of the plaintiff's bag 
delivered to defendant, and there being no evidence 
before this court, it must abide by that finding. 
The Oregon court, in the Voyt decision, also cited 
and quoted with approval the California case of Englarnd 
vs. Lyon Fireproof Storag,e Company, 271 Pac. 532, 
wherein plaintiff bailor sued the defendant warehouse for 
negligent loss of certain goods. The receipt provided 
that responsibility of the defendant '' 'is limited to the 
sum of $25, unless the value thereof is made known at the 
time of the storing, and receipted for in the schedule, 
and an additional charge made for the higher valuation 
. . . ' '' No evidence existed that the bailor made any 
declaration of value, but the lower California court found 
that the defendant knew the contents of some of the 
crates but not others. The appellate court ruled that 
the limitation controlled as to the articles "whos·e iden-
tity and value were unknown to the defendant.'' This 
California decision cited Williston on Contracts, Vol. 4, 
Rev. Ed. p. 2927, quoted again by the Oregon court, to 
the effect that, "The better view supports such a limi-
tation if the requisites for the formation of a contract 
are satisfied. ' ' 
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Another California decision approved by the V oyt 
case supra, is Donlon Br,os. vs. Southern Pacific Co., 91 
Pac. 603. The Oregon court quoted from that California 
opinion as follows: 
'' 'A contract between a railroad company 
and a shipper, reasonable and voluntarily entered 
into by the parties, the primary purpose of which 
was, as the rates of transportation charged by 
the railroad were measured by the valuation of j 
the property shipped, to fix an agreed valuation f. 
on such property as a basis upon which freight 
rates should be charged and paid, on condition ( 
that in case of loss the railroad's liability should I 
be measured by such agreed valuation, is to be 
construed as an agreement fixing the valuation 
of the property shipped, and not as a contract 
limiting the liability of the railroad; arn.d in case 
of loss through the gross negligence of t,he rail-
road, its liability cawnot exceed the v~alruation so 
fixed.' " (Italics ours). 
The above California court's classification of limi-
tation such as ours as being not a real limitation of lia-
bility but an agreed or fixed valuation set by the parties, 
is applied throughout the decisions, including the Voyt 
case. 
The California decision of Ge10rge, et ~al, vs. Bekins 
Moving Van & Stor:age Company, 205 Pac. 2d 1037, re-
versing the District Court of Appeals, 196 Pac. 2d 637, 
gives an excellent summary of the California decisions ' 
upon the limitations contained in warehouse receipts. 
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There, the plaintiff delivered some goods to the defen-
dant for storage and they were destroyed by fire through 
defendant's negligence. The California statute, ( iden-
tical with Oregon) being Section 3 of the Uniform Ware-
house Receipts Act, reads as follows : ''A warehouseman 
may insert in a receipt, issued by him, any other terms 
and conditions, provided that such terms and conditions 
shall not ... (b) In anywise impair his obligation to 
exercise that degree of care in the safekeeping of the 
goods entrusted to him which a reasonably careful man 
would exercise in regard to similar goods of his own.'' 
The plaintiff, about a month after the delivery of the 
goods, received a warehouse receipt by mail, which pro-
vided that the value of any article '' 'shall not exceed 
$10 per 100 pounds unless the Depositor fixes a greater 
value in writing at the time of the delivery thereof to 
this Company and the same is receipted hereon, in 
which event the Depositor agrees to pay an additional 
charge therefor.' '' Before sending the goods to defen-
dant, plaintiff had notified it the goods were valuable. 
There is no evidence that plaintiff knew of the limitation 
or declared value, or consented to it. This California 
statute, says the court, ''should not be interpreted as re-
stricting the right of contract as to an agreed valuation 
of property for the purpose of fixing a responsibility 
any further than it is restricted under the common law 
rule. At common law such agreed valuation was not con-
sidered a limitation of liability for either ordinary or 
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gross negligence.'' In holding the limitation binding, 
the court commented as follows : 
''In jurisdictions in this country where the 
common-law rule obtains, it is the prevailing doc-
trine that there is a wide distinction between a 
contract by a carrier providing for exemption 
from liability for its negligence and a contra~t, 
fairly entered into, whereby, in consideration of a 
reduced rate of compensation for the transpor-
tation, the shipper and carrier agree upon a fixed 
valuation therefor under which the responsibil-
ity of the carrier in case of loss shall be measured. 
(Citing cases). The validity of such valuation 
clauses does not depend on the relationship be-
tween the actual value and the stipulated value, 
or on whether the carrier or bailee has knowledge 
that the actual value is greater than the stipu-
lated value.'' 
The opinion ruled that the California ease of EngZand 
vs. Lyon Fire Proof Storage Company, supra, is, so far 
as it holds that the declared value clause was invalid if 
the bailee knew the actual value of the goods, ''not 
in accord with the cas·es cited above and is disapproved." 
In discussing the point whether a contract was made be-
tween the parties, the opinion stated: 
''Ordinarily such assent (of the bailM.. to the 
written contract) may be found in the aceeptance 
or retention of the warehouse receipt by the 
bailor." citing 1 Williston on Contracts (Rev. 
Ed.) §90B, p. 266. 
The court further held that the reduced rate at which 
the goods were stored ''was adequate consideration for 
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the limitation of liability . . . There is no indication 
that had plaintiffs on receipt of the warehouse receipt 
specified a higher value for their goods, that defendant 
would not have charged them the higher rate for the 
first month.'' The court modified the judgment by re-
ducing plaintiff's recovery to the value set forth in the 
bill of lading. 
This court, in Homer vs. R·aivroad, 42 Utah 15, 128 
Pac. 522, passed upon a case involving facts which could 
be quite similar to those of the instant case. There, the 
result of the alleged negligent acts of the defendant car-
rier in losing the plaintiff's trunk is comparable to the 
finding in our case that defendant delivered the plaintiff's 
bag to some unknown person. In the Homer case, a 
stranger received permission from defendant's baggage 
man to enter the baggage room for the stated purpose 
of getting some things from his trunk, which was also 
checked, and while there, intentionally exchanged his 
baggage check with that on the plaintiff's trunk "and 
in that way obtained the duplicate check for respondent's 
trunk." The respective parties, on presentation of their 
checks, received each other's baggage, and the stranger 
stole the contents from plaintiff's trunk. The defen-
dant's tariff schedules, filed pursuant to the Interstate 
Commerce Act, 24 Stat. L. 379, provided that 150 pounds 
of '' 'personal baggage will be checked on each full ticket 
and 75 pounds on each half ticket. Charge will be made 
for excess weight in accordance with the following tariffs, 
or succeeding issues thereof: ... Liability for baggage 
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in the possession of any of the companies over which 
thes·e tickets read whether same is checked or unchecked, 
in transit or in storage, is limited to wearing apparel not 
exceeding $100 in value for a whole ticket and $50 for 
a half-ticket.' '' The conditions under which the baggage 
was checked were stated on the railroad ticket and were 
as follows: '' 'This company . . . assumes no liability 
... on this ticket for baggage, except for wearing apparel 
and then only for $100 in value, unless a contract in writ-
ing is made for greater value. ' '' This court held that 
the regulations filed under the Interstate Commerce Act 
are not applicable, and affirmed judgment for plaintiff 
for the full amount of the articles lost. The court af-
firmed the lower court's refusal to admit in evidence the 
conditions on the ticket and the aforesaid regulations. 
"In any event, the effect to be given to those matters is 
entirely for the court, and, although they had been ex-
pressly admitted in evidence, the result, so far as it 
affected appellant's liability, would still have been the 
same as a matter of law.'' The court held that the 
ticket and the regulations "do not amount to an agree-
ment such ·as will prevent the passenger from recovering 
the full value of his baggage when lost through the neg-
ligence of the carrier, or through acts over which it 
has control.'' Contrary to the impression received 
from the brief of appellant in the instant case, this court, 
as shown in the Homer case: 
"Is committed to the doctrine that a common 
carrier may limit its common law liability for loss 
of property as an insurer. The proposition (as to 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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negligence) is not involved in this case, and there--
fore we do not decide whether a common carrier 
may not under certain circumstances by an ex-
press or necessarily implied agreement, when 
freely and fairly made, limit its liability for loss 
of property, even though such loss be occasioned 
through the ordinary negligence of the carrier or 
through acts over which it has control." (Italics 
ours). 
The U. S. Supreme Court, in Oregon Short Line 
Railroad vs. Homer', 235 U.S. 693, 59 L. Ed. 428, in a 
per curiam decision, reversed the judgment and re-
manded the case "for futher proceedings upon author-
ity of Boston and M. R. Co. vs. Roo1ker (supra). There-
fore, we have a direct ruling by the U. S. Supreme Court 
that the limitation of liability contained in the railroad's 
tariff schedules, regulations and limitations does not 
exclude any particular type of loss, be it one of negli-
gence or conversion. 
In Shay vs. U. Bac. R. Co., 47 Utah 252, 153 Pac. 31, 
this court recognized the rule of the Bosto'YIA vs. RoDke'(r( 
case, supra, and Bart vs. Pennsylvania, supra, and quoted 
from the Hooker opinion as follows : '' '. . . Thus a 
common carrier may by contract limit his liability for 
certain purposes even as against his negligent acts or 
the negligent acts of his servants . . . ' '' That decision 
turned upon a set of facts different from our case, and 
the specific wording of the bill of }ading is cotnsidered. 
The court ruled that the limitation did not apply to a 
loss such as suffered by plaintiff through the negligent 
operation of defendant's train engine. 
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Let us consider the decisions of still other jurisdiC-
tions upon our question. Arkansas holds that a flat limi-
tation restricting a liability in a parcel check stub to a 
specified amount is valid. Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Fuqua, 
233 S.W. 926. There the complaint asked for the value 
of a suit case and its contents alleg·ed to have been de-
stroyed through defendant's negligence in failing to re-
move it from the store room after discovering that its 
depot was on fire. No federal statute was involved. De-
fendant answered that if plaintiff recover anything, 
recovery should be limited to a maximum of $25, as 
stipulated on the parcel check. There was no evidence 
that the defendant had posted in its depot a notice of 
limitation. The language on the parcel check read as 
follows: ''The carrier will not be responsible for loss, 
damage, or detention of articles left in storage for any 
amount in excess of $25." The opinion is silent as to 
whether plaintiff knew of the limitation. The plaintiff 
contended that def.endant could not limit its liability 
growing out of its own negligence. In answer, the court 
stated that ''The contract is broad enough to limit ap-
pellant's liability on any account .... A warehouseman 
may limit his liability to an agreed value of the article 
l'·eceived where the rate charged was based upon the 
value of the article. The court held for the railroad and 
cited in support of its ruling the U. S. Supreme Oourt 
case of K. C. 8. R. Co. v. Oarl, supra. 
The above case of Missou-ri Pac. R. Co. v. Fuqwa was 
recently approved by the same court in Miss!ouri Pac. 
Transp. Co. v. Willia.ms, 182 S.W. 2d 762. The facts are 
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about the san1e. The same type of limitation of liability 
was written upon the parcel check given to plaintiff at 
the time she checked her handbag at defendant's parcel 
room. Plaintiff testified that she did not read the printed 
words of the check, nor was her attention called to its 
terms. Defendant's agent testified at the trial that 
the loss of the bag occurred ''through the porter just 
handing out too many bags to some person.'' The 
limitation there is not one based on a declared value such 
as is our case, where the shipper is given the option of 
paying a higher rate for increased value. Nevertheless, 
the court held the limitation valid, and reduced the lower 
court judgment to $25, the amount of the limitation. The 
court made no distinction because the fact that appel-
lant's agent was negligent in delivering the baggage to 
another person. "The purpose of the stipulation was to 
limit its liability for negligence, not to exempt it en-
tirely.'' The Williams decision, in support, quoted from 
an Illinois case, Noyes v. Hines, 220 Ill. App. 409, as 
follows: 
"We think the weight of authority is to the 
effect that when a person accepts a ticket from a 
bailee in receipt for a parcel deposited with him, 
he is bound by the terms and conditions of that 
receipt in so far as he has reasonable notice of 
the same, and in so far as the same are reason-
able. In this case it does not seem to be unreason-
able to hold that a person depositing luggage or 
similar articles temporarily, in the manner as 
shown by the evidence, and for a consideration of 
only 10 cents to be paid by him, would expect that 
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there would be some limitation pla0ed upon the 
value of the article so deposited. If this were not 
so then the defendant would have been bound if 
plaintiff had deposited with his suit case $100,000 
worth of diamonds or other articles of similar 
great value. The condition, therefore, in itself, 
seems to have been a reasonable one. The notice 
as to the condition would also seem to have been 
reasonable. The defendant had a right to assume 
that the plaintiff could read the English language; 
had also a right to assume that the plaintiff would 
take notice that by reason of the very small 
charge he could not expect an unlimited liability." 
The abov·e language certainly fits our present case. 
The appellant here would have this court allow him some 
Two Thousand One Hundred and Ninety Dollars ($2,-
190.00) merely for the sum of 10 cents paid respondent, 
and in the face of the parc-el check and posted notice 
limitation which the lower court found to be visible to 
defendant. There was nothing in the situation at the 
time the hailn1ent was made to prevent appellant's stat-
ing the claimed value of the bag and its contents. llfis-
souri Pacific v. Williarms, decision, supra, cited with ap-
proval the Ohio case of Central Sto·nage W,arehouse Com-
parny v. Pickening, supra, to the effect that if such are-
ceipt limiting liability is given to the bailor, it" 'becomes 
a contract between the parties and the person receiving 
and holding such receipt even though he does not sign 
the same or otherwise expressly assent to its terms and 
conditions and is chargeable with knowledge of such 
terms and conditions and is bound by the sam·e .... '" 
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The annotation at 27 A.L.R. 57 lists an English case 
upholding a parcel check limitation of liability. In 
Gibarud v. Great Eastern R. Co., 2 K. B. (Eng.) 426, 
plaintiff sued for the loss of his bicycle left at the de-
fendant's office. He was given a receipt limiting liability 
to a specific amount " 'unless at the time of deposit the 
true value and nature of the article shall have been de-
clared' '', and an increased charge paid according to the 
added value. The court held the limitation reasonable 
even though it protected the defendant company from its 
own negligence. " 'Particularly in a case where it is 
eminently reasonable that they should ·be. protected-
if the man who deposits property of large value has not 
taken the trouble to pay the company for the excess 
in value of the property which he is leaving with them.' '' 
The other decisions, cited in the above A.L.R. annota-
tion, and which appear at first glance to take the oppo-
site view, are concerned with fixed limitations of liabil-
ity, not based upon any declared value and the option 
of paying an increased charge. 
Appellant's brief at Page 19 quotes from A'f!l'erican 
Jurispntdence in support of appellant's proposition that 
our type of limitation of liability is invalid. That quota-
tion is not at all in point. A statement from the same 
authority appearing elsewhere is proof of this. In Vol. 
10 .Am. Jur. 454 the general rule is giv:en: 
"1749. LIMITATIONS AS TO AMOUNT' 
OF LIABILITY OR VALUE OF BAGGAGE. 
According to the great weight of authority, a com-
mon carrier of passengers may make reasonable 
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stipulations as to the value of baggage intrusted 
to it by a passenger or make reasonable limita-
tions as to the amount for which it shall be liable 
in case of the loss of a passenger's baggage, 
which will bind the passenger, even though the 
loss results from the carrier's negligence, although 
there are some decisions expressive of a contrary 
view.'' 
Vol. 7 A.L.R. Page 1234 summarizes the decisions per-
taining to limitations of carrier's liability in respect to 
baggage checked in a parcel room. 
''III. Effect of Clause or Notice Limiting 
Liability. The majority of cases hold that, while 
a carrier who accepts baggage in its parcel room 
on payment of a fee is liable for ordinary negli-
gence, the bailor or depositor is presumed to have 
knowledge of a condition or stipulation printed 
on the duplicate parcel check, limiting the car-
rier's liability to a sum stated thereon, and is 
bound by the provisions printed on the check.'' 
The annotation cites and summarizes a number of Eng-
lish decisions in accord, some of which involve a fixed 
limitat.lon where there is no charge based upon declared 
value. Also cited is the South Carolina case of Ter.ry 
v. Southern R. Oo., 62 S.E. 249, where the plaintiff 
checked a suit case at defendant's parcel room and re-
ceived therefor·e a receipt which had upon it a printed 
stipulation providing that: " 'In consideration of the 
low rate at which it is issued, no clalim in excess of $10 
shall be made against the railroad company for loss of or 
injury to any package, valise, or other article which may 
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have been deposited with it, (the railroad company) and 
for which this ticket has been issued.' '' 
The bag was lost !hrough defendant's negligence. The 
court stated that the defendant, in accepting parcels and 
bags for deposit at its station, was not acting as a com-
mon carrier but as a warehouseman, and that,'' As such 
warehouseman ... it had a right to contract for the 
limitation of the amount of its liability in case of loss, 
and the receipt expressing such limitation was binding 
on the owner of the goods.'' 
III. 
APPELLANT'S POINT III CONCERNING AC-
CEPTANCE PRESENTS A QUESTION NOT PRO-
PERLY BEFORE THIS COURT, AND IS CON-
TRARY TO THE WEIGHT OF AUTHORITY. 
In addition to the foregoing argument, respondent 
would like to further answer appellant's point III, where-
in he contends not only that he must have accepted the 
"offer of defendant" to limit its liability, but that no 
such acceptance is shown. The authorities presented 
above by respondent prove the rule to be that the ques-
tion of acceptance is one of fact for the trial court, and 
subordinate to the ultimate finding of an agreement or 
contract. As stated in French v. Bekin8 Moving & Stor-
ag,e, supra, the finding "that the defendant was 'liable 
upon a contractual limitation of ten cents per pound,' 
necessarily implies a finding that plaintiff did know-
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ingly assent to the ten cent limitation, and supports that 
finding.'' 
Furthermore, in our instant ease, the lower court's 
findings are not inconsistent with the fact of appellant's 
acceptance, or assent, as those terms are used in con-
tract law. Mere acceptance and use of the claim check 
and receipt is, in the absence of unusual circumstances 
amounting to bad faith or unfair advantage by a bailee,} 
held by the majority of courts to amount to acceptance 
of the receipt's terms, and the failure of the bailor to 
read or learn of the stipulation is of no avail to him. See 
Boston & M,ain R. R. v. Ho,oker, supra; Normile v. Ore-
gon R. & Nav. Co., supra; Central Warehouse v. Picker-
ing, supra; ~and Mo. Pac. Trans. Co. v. Will~ams, supra, 
also 7 A.L.R. 1234, supra. The lower court found that de-
fendant gave appellant, Allen, a receipt, or parcel check, 
and that he kept it and later presented it to defendant. 
Here we have the finding that defendant had its notice 
of limitation posted "where it was visible to- plaintiff 
as he cheeked his said bag. . . . '' The court made no 
finding that Allen did not accept the limitation provi-
sions, or that he objected to them, or declared a value 
for his bag or contents. The court's finding that Allen 
did not read or see the notice, or know of any limitation, 
and that defendant did not ''advise'' plaintiff of, or call 
plaintiff's attention to, the said limitation provisions, 
does not preclude the existence of acceptance or assent 
implied from the circumstances. That such acceptance . 
existed is exactly the inference to he drawn from the 
court's finding that a contract was formed. To adopt 
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appellant's argument \vould defeat most contractual ob-
ligations now upheld by the courts, and would make the 
carrier an easy victim of fraudulent schemes. Failure 
to read or know what an agreement contains, or failure 
of one party to advise the other of the terms, is not, 
for very sotmd reasons, a defense to a suit upon a con-
tract. This salutary rule should govern no less in the 
situation now before the court. Respondent again sub-
mits, however, upon the authorities presented above in 
its argument, that this court, without the record be-
fore it, cannot look behind the finding of the lower court 
that a contract existed, and determine whether or not 
Allen accepted the limitation. See the case of Lebkeucher 
v. Pa. R. Co., (N. J.) 116 A, 323, quoted in appellant's 
brief, where the court considered as final the lower 
court's finding of no acceptance, no duty to take notice· 
of the receipt and placard, and no contract. 
IV. 
POINT IV OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF AS TO 
CONVERSION HAS NO SUPPORT IN LAW OR IN 
FACT. 
Appellant would have this court find that the terms 
of the contract did not cover the present situation: that 
the word "loss" in the limitation did not include "con-
version.'' In the first place, the lower court made no 
finding of a conversion of plaintiff's bag. Appellant has 
constructed this idea from the court's finding" That the 
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defendant did not take due care of or safely keep the 
goods of the plaintiff, nor did it, when requested, return 
or redeliver the same to the plaintiff, but, on the con-
trary, defendant deliv-ered said bag, together with the. 
contents therein, to some person or persons unknown to 
the plaintiff, and that in so doing, the bag and its con-
tents were wholly lost to the plaintiff." Respondent sub-
mits that the court's finding that "the defendant did 
not take due care of or safely keep the goods of plain-
tiff,'' amounts to a finding of negligence only, and that 
no finding was made that respondent intentionally de-
livered the bag to another person or converted it to its 
own use. The respondent further submits that the lower 
court's determination after considering all of the evi-
dence, that a contract was formed between the parties 
limiting liability in this particular case, is a finding which 
is conclusive upon this court, and the question whether 
the limitation covered the loss of plaintiff's bag is not 
subject- to review. Appellant's own cited cas·e of Leb-
keucher v. Pa. R. Co., supra, is authority for this point. 
That such a situation as ours does not amount to a 
conversion is held in the recent case of GBorrge e~t al v. 
Bekins Van & Storog·e Co., et al, supra. The California 
court summarized the law as follows: 
''The tort of conv.ersion exists if there is 
an exertion of wrongful dominion over the per-
sonal property of another in denial of or incon-
sistent with his rights therein. Zaslow v. Kroen-
ert, 29 Cal. 2d 541, 549, 176 P. 2d 1; Gruber v. 
Pacific States Sav. & Loan Co., 13 Cal. 2d 144, 
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1-18, 88 P. 2d 137; see, Prosser on Torts, p. 95. 
The tort is committed when a bailee having the 
power to do so refuses to redeliver goods to which 
the bailor is entitled .... If redelivery is impos-
sible, however, because the goods have been lost 
or destroyed, either without fault on the part 
of the bailee or merely because of his negligence, 
there is no conversion. Negligence in caring for 
the goods is not an act of dominion over them 
such as is necessary to make the bailee liable as 
a converter." 
The Restatement of Torts, Vol. I, Sections 235 
through 237, is directly contrary to appellant's argument 
that the loss of his bag amounted to a conversion. Sec-
tion 237 (d) states the following rule: 
''d. The refusal to surrender a chattel upon 
demand is not a conversion if the person upon 
whom the demand is made does not have posses-
sion of the chattel at the time of the demand. If 
the goods have been disposed of or intentionally 
destroyed, either properly or improperly, the 
actor is not liable for his refusal to surrender 
them. . . . So, too, if the goods have been lost, 
harmed or destroyed through the negligence of 
the person in possession, whether such negligence 
consists of active misconduct or a failure to per-
form acts which it was his duty to perform, such 
person may be liable for his negligence, but he 
is not liable for a conversion under the rule stated 
in this Section.' ' 
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that defend-
ant was guilty of such conversion, none of the decisions 
of the U. S. Supreme Court, or of Oregon, or California, 
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or most other jurisdictions, make any distinction be-
tween conversion and loss of bailed goods by other means. 
In Georg1ia, Florida, & Alab·ama R:ailway Compamty v. 
Blish Milling Compam;y, 241 U.S. 190, 60 L. Ed. 948, the 
Supreme Court held: 
''The effect of a stipulation in a bill of lad-
ing for an interstate shipment r·equiring claims 
for damages or misdelivery to be presented with-
in four months after a reasonable time for de-
livery has elapsed cannot be avoided by suing 
the carrier in trover on the theory that in making 
the misdelivery it converted the shipment, and 
thus abandoned the contract, since the parties 
could not waive the terms of the contract under 
which the shipment was made ... nor could the 
carrier by its conduct give the shipper the right 
to ignore the terms and hold the carrier to a 
different responsibility from that fixed by the 
agreement made under the published tariffs and 
regulations.'' 
Again, in Homer v. R. R., supra, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held a baggage loss limitation valid in a case where 
plaintiff expressly alleged in her complaint that the de-
fendant failed to ex·ercise reasonable care in keeping the 
goods, and wrongfully delivered the same to some per-
son or persons unknown to plaintiff. 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, 
in R·ailway E:v,press Agency, Inc., v. Marcha;n;t Calculat-
ing M·ach. Co., 52 Atl. 2d 277, decided an action wherein 
plaintiff sought recovery of goods shipped by the de-
fendant, which shipment was covered by the Interstate 
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Commerce Act. In holding the shipper bound by the 
limitation stated in the express receipt, the court com-
mented: 
'·Federal law will not permit the limitation . 
. to be escaped by local law or decision that un-
explained failure to deliver establishes conver-
sion ... Under federal law, failure to deliver is 
not a 'conYersion' . . . \\1hether the loss in the 
case before us resulted from conversion by the 
... employee (defendants) or from negligence of 
the employe, our conclusion is that the limitation 
of liability based on the declared value of the lost 
article ... is effective .... '' 
The Ohio court, in Cent~al Stor,age Warehouse Com-
pany v. Pickering, supra, held a limitation of liability 
in a warehouse receipt valid where plaintiff's suit was 
in trover for conversion of the goods. This case was 
cited and quoted in the above Oregon case of V oyt V'. 
Bekins J.lLoving & Storage Co., supra, without any indi-
cation that a distinction should be made between conver-
sion and other types of loss. 
Appellant's contention as to loss by conversion is. 
further destroyed by the wording of and the decisions 
upon the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, which was in 
effect in Oregon when appellant's bailment and loss oc-
curred. That act refers to ''any loss or injury to the 
goods caused by his (warehouseman's) failure to exer-
cise such care," etc. 4 0. C. L. A. Sec. 60-221. Decisions 
under this act make no distinction where loss occurs by 
conversion. See Voyt v. Be'Mins Moving & Storage, (Ore.) 
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supra; George v. Bekins, (Cal.) supra; Central Storage 
W·a.rehouse Co. v. Pickering, (Ohio), supra. 
It is beyond reason that the ins·ertion of the word 
''loss'' in the legislative acts, or in the limitation now 
before the court, was made with the intent of excluding 
trover. Many losses by bailees would not be covered. 
The word "loss" means loss by any means. Appellant 
would make an exception where none appears. As stated 
by the Arkansas court, in Mo. Rae. R. Co. v. Fuqwa, 
supra, the words '' 'loss, damage, or detention of arti-
cles left in storage' ", appearing on the receipt, are 
"broad enough to limit appellant's liability on any ac-
count." 
v. 
CASES CITED BY AP:eELLANT 
Respondent, after considerable search, has been un-
able to find one decision cited in appellant's brief which 
is concerned with a limitation of liability, such as ours, 
based upon a sliding scale of charges tied to the declared 
value of the bailed property. Respondent's argument 
here has shown that that is exactly the distinction drawn 
in most courts. Many of appellant's cases, moreover, 
are directly opposed to his contention that limitations of 
liability are contrary to public policy. Jones v. Great 
N;orthern R1ailway Compan;y, 217 Pac. 673; Lebkeucher v. 
Pennsylvamia Railway Comparny, 116 A. 323. Appellant's 
decisions are, for the most part, cases in which the whole 
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record, including the testimony, was before the review-
ing court and, therefore, it passed upon the question 
whether a contract was formed. D·enver Unlion Terminal 
Ry. Co. v. Cullina.n, 210 Pac. 602. In our case, the lower 
court has so found and no transcript is before this 
court to enable it to review that question. 
The Oregon case of Pilson v. Tip-Top Auto Com-
pany, 136 Pac. 6-!2, quoted by appellant, involved only 
an alleged oral agreement between the parties whereby 
''defendant assumed no liability whatever for the safety, 
preservation, or" redelivery (of the property) save only 
as against its own willful and intentional misconduct.'' 
Appellant also advances in sup~ort of his argument the 
Ohio case of Agricultural Insurance Company v. Con--
stantine, 58 N. E. 2d. 658. There, the court considered an 
exemption and loss of a car "''from whatev·er cause aris-
ing," and is obviously not in point. Central Storage 
Warehouse Corrnpo;ny v. Pickering, supra, is still the 
present rule in Ohio. The California case of England v. 
Lyons Firepro1of Storage Co., presented in appellant's 
brief as authority for his proposition that a limitation 
of liability is contrary to public policy, expressly held 
that the limitation is valid where the bailee does not 
know the value of the goods. The very recent California 
case of George v. Bekins Moving & St:orrage Co., supra, 
quoted above by respondent, expressly disapproves that 
part of the Lyons decision ruling voiding the limitation 
where the bailee knows the value, and, therefore, re-
moves any support that decision might have given ap-
pellant. 
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A reading of the Montana case of Jones v. Great 
Northern Railiro·ad Company, supra, quoted extensively 
and put forth by appellant as direct authority for his 
proposition that the limitation must have been accepted 
by appellant, reveals that the decision is concerned with 
a fixed liability set by defendant " 'not to exceed 
$10.00' ''. Furthermore, the defendant did not have a 
sign posted near the check room giving notice of any limi-
tation. The Montana court concedes that plaintiff may 
be bound by the limitation provision ''if his course of 
conduct is such as to ' lead the bailee, as a reasonable 
person, to believe that he assents to the provision; and 
the mere fact that he retains the check without objection 
does not, as a matter of law, constitute such conduct, 
and in the absence of notice from the ba:ilee ... the bailor 
is not under legal duty to read whatever inscription may 
be upon it." In our own case, the only logical deduction 
from the lower court's conclusion that a contract existed 
is that the court found that plaintiff had sufficient notice 
of the limitation to bind him. In Lebkeucher v. Fa. R. Oo·., 
supra, quoted by appellant, the lower court made a find-
ing of fact that the receipts and placard did not make a 
contract limiting defendant's liability. Here we have the 
reverse situation. The Denver Union Terminal Ry. Co. v. 
Cullinan case, supra, stressed by appellant, involved only 
a fixed limitation of liability regardless of value, as did 
appellant's case of Fessle;r v. Detroit Taxioab & Trans-
fer Comp(]ffby, 171 N.W. 360. In the latter case, the 
Michigan court cited D'Ut,assy v. Barrett, 157 N.Y. Supp. 
916, 114 N.E. 786, in which a bill of lading provided that, 
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" 'In consideration of the rate charged for carrying 
said property, which is regulated by the value thereof, 
. . . the shipper agrees that the company shall not be 
liable in any event for more than fifty dollars' '', etc. 
This situation is, states the Michigan court, "clearly a 
Yery different case than the one before us.'' And so 
''ith us, the facts of our case present a situation quite 
different from that contained in appellant's decisions., 
Respondent again emphasizes that appellant has not 
presented one decision which is in point for his argu-: 
ments, or is opposed to this respondent's position. 
CONCLUSION 
The type of limitation contract now before this court 
is upheld by the highest court of the United States, by 
many other tribunals, and by the highest court of Oregon, 
the place where the contract was made and the loss oc-
curred. Such a limitation, based as it is upon a varying 
charge to the. bailee dependent upon the declared value, 
is not contrary to public policy in Oregon or elsewhere, 
whether the loss occurs through a conversion of the 
property, negligence of the bailee, or misdelivery to 
another person. The limitation of value contract be-
tween this appellant and respondent covered the very 
loss that the court found took place. 
The determination by the lower court that the ex-
tent of respondent's liability was by contract limited to 
a certain amount is in truth a finding which, in the ab-
sence of the transcript of testimony, is not subject to 
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review. If it were, however, here open to redetermina-
tion, the issues raised by the pleadings, and the findings 
and conclusions o.f the lower court, together with the 
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, support 
the judgment. 
Respondent respectfully submits, upon the record 
now before this court and upon the fully qualified author-
ities above presented, that the judgment appealed from 
should be affirmed. 
CROSS ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 
I. 
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN 
SUSTAINING APPELLANT'S GENERAL DEMUR-
RER TO RESPONDENT'S FIRST ANSWER. 
Rule VIII of this court permits respondent to assign 
cross-errors in his brief. This court has held that such 
assignments are permissible without a cross -appeal 
where the respondent does not seek reversal or modifi-
cation of the judgment. San Pedr-o, etc., R. R. v. Board ,of 
Education, 35 Utah 13, 99 Pac. 263. Respondent sub-
mits that the lower court was in error when it sustained 
plaintiff's (appellant's) general demurrer to the affirma-
tive defense set forth in paragraph 5 of respondent's 
first answer. The demurrer was upon the ground that 
the so-called affirmative defense set forth in Paragraph 
(5) of defendant's said original Answer does not state 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
49 
facts sufficient to constitute a defense to plaintiff's cause 
of action. In that answer, respondent set forth that any 
''delivery and deposit were subject to the Regulations 
Governing Parcel Checking Charges, issued by defend-
ant and filed in Book 1, Section 7 of defendant's Pas-
senger Tariff File, as authorized and required by the 
Interstate Commerce Commission pursuant to the In-
terstate Commerce Act, being Title 49 U. S. C. A. No. 20; 
that said Regulations limited defendant's liability to 
$25.00 for any loss or damage to any parcel unless, at 
the time such parcel was checked with defendant a 
greater value was declared and paid for at the rates set 
out in said Regulation.'' After setting forth the form 
and terms of the parcel check and posted notice, the 
said answer further alleged that ''the said regulations, 
notice, and parcef checks gave notice at all times named 
in plaintiff's complaint that defendant would not accept 
any parcel valued in excess of $250.00" and tliat plain-
tiff did not make any declaration of value or pay an 
additional charge. 
The Federal statute which respondent believes 
should apply is 49 U. S. C. A. Sec. 20 (11). After pro-
viding that no contract or regulation shall exempt a 
cbmmon carrier or transportation company from full 
liability, it reads as follows: 
''That the provisions hereof respecting lia-
bility for full actual loss, damage, or injury, 
notwithstanding any limitation of liability or re-
covery or representation or agreement or release 
as to value, and declaring any such limitation to 
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be unlawful and void, shall not apply, first, to 
baggage carried on passenger trains or boats, 
or trains or boats carrying passengers; second, to 
property, except ordinary livestock, received for 
transportation concerning which the carrier shall 
have been or shall be expressly authorized or re-
quired by order of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission to establish and maintain rates depend-
ent upon the value declared in writing by the 
shipper or agreed upon in writing as the released 
value of the property, in which case such declara-
tion or agreement shall have no other effect 
than to limit liability and recovery to an amount 
not exceeding the value so declared or released, 
and shall not, so far as relates to values, be held 
to be a violation of section 10 of this chapter; 
and any tariff schedule which may be filed with 
the commission pursuant to such order shall con-
tain specific reference thereto and may estab-
lish rates varying with the value so declared or 
agreed upon ; and the commission is empowered 
to make such order in cases where rates depend-
ent upon and varying with declared or agreed 
values would, in its opinion, be just and reason-
able under the circumstances and conditions sur-
rounding the transportation.'' 
Respondent has been unable to find any court decision 
for or against the application of this statute to a parcel 
check stand bailment. It appears to respondent however, 
that the baggage room cases are sufficiently analogous 
to be authority for placing our case, and respondent's 
first answer, under the above Interstate Commerce Act. 
Respondent here maintains that it was entitled to show 
facts to place it within the statute, such as the interstate 
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nature of the plaintiff's trip and of the transportation 
and deposit of the bag. The ruling of the lower court 
on the demurrer denied respondent that right. 
The U. S. 'Supreme Court holds that baggage is in 
interstate con1n1erce if it is to move or the passenger, 
by his ticket, is to n1ove in another state. That court 
further holds that the rules of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission apply where rates are based on value pur-
suant to authority from the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission. Lancaster v. McCarty, 267 U. S. 427, 69 L. Ed. 
696. 
As respondent's argument has heretofore indicated, 
the courts apply the said federal statute where the goods 
are lost while resting in the carrier's station. See 
Homer v. Railr:oad, supra. Further, the Supreme Court 
holds that the valuation limitation of the carrier's sched-
ules ''automatically attached'' if the shipper did not 
declare the value. Boston & M. R. Co. v. Hooker, supra. 
It must be remembered that the above cited Commerce 
Act also provides : 
''The schedules printed as aforesaid by any 
such common carrier shall plainly state the places 
between which property and passengers will be 
carried, and shall contain the classification of 
freight in force, and shall also state separately 
all terminal charges, storage charges, icing 
charges, and all other charges which the com-
mission may require, all privileges or facilities 
granted or allowed and any rules or regulations 
which in any wise change, affect, or determine 
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any part or the aggregate of such aforesaid rates, 
fares, and charges, or the value of the service 
rendered to the passenger, shipper, or consignee. 
Such schedules shall ·be plainly printed in large 
type, and copies for the use of the public shall be 
kept posted in two public and conspicuous places 
in every depot, station, or office of such carrier 
where passengers or freight, respectively, are 
received for transportation, in such form that 
they shall be accessible to the public and can be 
conveniently inspected.'' 
49 U.S.C.A. Sec. 6, par. (1). 
As the Supreme Court said, in Boston & M. R. Co. 
v. Hooker, supra, in referring to this section: 
''It seems to us that the ordinary signification 
of the terms used in the act would cover such re-
quirements as are here made for the amount of 
recovery for baggage lost by the carrier. It is a 
regulation which fixes and determines the amount 
to be charged for the carriage in view of the re-
sponsibility assumed, and it also affects the value 
of the service rendered to the passenger. Such 
requirements are spoken of, in decisions dealing 
with them, as regulations; as, a common carrier 
'may prescribe rei(Julations to protect himself 
against imposition and fraud, and fix a rate of 
charges proportionate to the magnitude of the 
risks he may have to encounter.' " 
In our case, the use of the check stand was a facility 
furnished the public and plaintiff in connection with the 
respondent's transportation services. 
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The Supreme Court later considered a baggage loss 
case where the state court refused to consider the rate 
schedules filed under the Interstate Commerce Act be-
cause not certified. The state court held the carrier to 
the full value of the goods. The Supreme Court declared : 
"In order to determine the liability assumed 
for baggage it was proper to consider applicable 
tariff schedules on file with the Interstate Conl-
merce Commission; and the carrier had a Federal 
right not only to a fair opportunity to put these 
in evidence, but also that, when before the court, 
they should be given due consideration ... After 
their admission in evidence by the trial court the 
schedules could not be disregarded arbitrarily 
without denying the railroad's Federal right; and 
we think they were so treated by the court of ap-
peals. We are cited to no decision of the supreme 
court of Missouri recognizing any settled rule of 
practice there which required such action, and the 
unjust consequences of it are apparent. Assuming, 
without deciding, the correctness of its opinion 
that the schedules as certified were inadmissible 
and improperly received, nevertheless the court 
should not have destroyed the carrier's oppor-
tunity to protect itself by introducing other evi-
dence upon a new trial.'' 
N. Y. Central R. R. Co. v. Beham, 242 U. S. 148, 61 
L. Ed. 210. 
The Supreme Court of Alabama, in a well reasoned 
and extensive opinion, held that the plaintiff was limited 
in his recovery to the sum of $25 as set forth in the 
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baggage check which she received from the porter. Bir-
mingham Teff'minal Co. v. Wilson, 31 So. 563. The lower 
court had refused to admit in evidence "Local and Joint 
Passenger Carrier Tariff'' regulations, certified by the 
Interstate Commerce Commission. The hand bag in ques-
tion was lost after being delivered to the defendant's 
redcap by plaintiff upon alighting from the train. The 
claim check provided that a greater value could be de-
clared in writing, and coverage was given upon payment 
of an additional charge for each hundred dollars in value 
''but not to exceed the total value of $500. '' The above 
Tariff Regulation provided this same limitation for red-
cap service. Plaintiff contended that the word "bag-
gage'' as set forth in the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 
U. S. C. A. Section 20 (11) means property checked for 
transportation ''as incidental to passenger carriage and 
not to hand baggage carried with the person of the pas-
senger." The court rejected this argument, and held 
that the federal law applied. Concerning the validity 
of the limitation, the decision observed: 
''But it has been consistently held that valua-
tion agreements may be sustained without the 
aid of a statute on principles of estoppel and in 
carefully restricted cases where choice of rates 
was given, and where the rate was tied to the re-
lease.'' (Citing U. S. Supreme Court and other 
decisions). 
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The opinion cited the California decision of Franklin v. 
So·u.tkern Pacific Railroad, 265 Pac. 936, which held that 
the Interstate Commerce Act applied to redcap porter 
service. The Alabruna court quoted from this California 
decision as follows : 
''We can think of no reason why there should 
be any difference between baggage in the custody 
of a porter as a servant of the carrier, and lost 
through his negligence, and baggage in the cus-
tody of a baggageman, likewise a servant of the 
carrier, and lost through his negligence.'' 
The court made the following comment, which appears 
to respondent to be particular]y in point in our own case : 
''But the tariff and regulation filed in re-
spect to the instant case apply expressly to red 
cap service and to a passenger's hand baggage, 
and contain a choice of rates affected hy declared 
valuations.'' 
Here, respondent's answer expressly alleged that 
the tariff schedules filed with the Interstate Commerce 
Commission limited appellant's liability and showed that 
such regulations contained a choice of rates. 
Upon the above authorities, respondent submits that 
the lower court committed error in sustaining plaintiff's 
general demurrer to the affirmative defense set out in 
Paragraph 5 of respondent's answer. Because the ques-
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ing importance, respondent now requests this court to 
pass upon it. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER I 
WILLIAM J. O'CONNOR, JR. \ 
Respondent 
Attorneys for Defendant ,and II 
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